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Slovenia's EU Presidency: ‘Si.nergy for Europe’1 
 
 
Irena Brinar * 
 
 
Theme: This ARI looks at the main challenges faced by the Slovenian Presidency of the 
EU as the first of the group of countries that joined the Union in 2004. 
 
 
Summary: Slovenia is the first of the member states that joined the EU in 2004 to have 
introduced the euro and taken up the Presidency of the Union in 2008. As part of the 
newly-introduced treble Presidency team –the Trio, along with Germany and Portugal–, it 
will be the last of the initial three to take up the Presidency and its turn will be between 
those of two member states that are considered the ‘engines of European integration’: 
Germany at the beginning of the first Trio and France at the beginning of the second. 
Slovenia’s ambition is to be a ‘good Presidency’. 
 
 
Analysis:  
 
The Presidency of the EU Taken Up by the ‘New’ Member States 
At the beginning of Slovenia’s Presidency of the Council of the EU, the European 
Commission (EC) wrote on its website: ‘The Presidency is moving to the East’. It thereby 
stressed that Slovenia –which meanwhile had introduced the euro– was the first of the 
states that entered the EU in 2004 to take over the Presidency. In the words of the 
President of the EC, Mr Durão Barroso, this ends –once and for all– the division between 
the ‘old’ and ‘new’ member-states. 
 
The development of the EU since the Maastricht Treaty –up to the conclusion of the 
Lisbon Treaty– has had a special impact on the recent history of Slovenia and its 
independence. The Slovenian political agenda in the 1990s included three key projects: 
 
• Independence and international recognition as the basis for its inclusion in the 
international community and organisations. 
• A political and economic transition to enable the introduction of political pluralism, a 
multi-party political system and a market economy. 
• EU membership. 
 
These projects required a national political consensus that has made possible a relative 
political stability and continued economic growth. 
 
                                                 
1 Si.nergy for Europe is the slogan chosen by the Slovenian presidency, related to the Slovenian Internet 
domain ‘si’. 
* Lecturer in European Studies, International and the EU Programmes Office, Ljubljana University, 
Slovenia 
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As a relative latecomer in the so-called Luxembourg group of candidate countries, 
Slovenia began its accession negotiations in 1998 and successfully completed them in 
2002. Its formal EU membership on 1 May 2004 marked the beginning of the ‘real work’ 
for Slovenia regarding three main projects: 
 
• Membership of the economic and monetary union and introduction of euro. 
• Membership of Schengen. 
• EU Presidency. 
 
Fulfilling all the Maastricht criteria, Slovenia introduced the euro on 1 January 2007, 
thereby changing its currency for the third time since independence. While the 
introduction of the euro was contingent on Slovenia’s own performance, the success of 
the Schengen project also depended on the cooperation with the other member states of 
the Schengen area. During the Finish Presidency –at the informal meeting of Ministers of 
the Interior in Tampere in September 2006–, the Slovenes and Portuguese proved to be 
crucial in overcoming the ‘technical problems’ regarding the extension of the Schengen 
area to the new member states. The Portuguese Minister of the Interior, Antonio Costa, 
agreed to extend the Schengen Information System (SIS I) to the new member states in 
order to facilitate their inclusion by 2007. The adoption of this solution is Slovenia’s first 
major success in shaping EU policies. 
 
However, all these important and demanding projects of the past two decades stretched 
the capacities of the relatively small Slovenian public administration to the maximum. 
Overworked and underpaid, many experienced and skilled public officials and experts left 
the public administration and found better paid and less stressful jobs elsewhere. 
 
The successful completion of projects such as membership in the EU, the EMU and 
Schengen were a historic development for the EU and its (old and new) member states as 
well as for their citizens and were consequently marked by major –national and 
European– public celebrations in the presence of key national and EU politicians. The EU 
Presidency, however, mainly involves the technical coordination of the EU’s daily and 
administrative affairs over six-month periods, which brings no further excitement to a 
(presiding) country and its citizens. As shown by the Eurobarometer (Standard 
Eurobarometer, Autumn 2007) and by interviews of foreign and Slovene journalists with 
experts and with the general public, Slovene citizens are well aware of this and see no 
comparison between the EU Presidency and the already achieved membership of the EU, 
EMU and Schengen. Pragmatically, they see the EU Presidency as a (mainly) technical 
project for the Slovenian government, parliament and public administration. However, they 
still consider it very important for Slovenia to have an enhanced visibility in Europe. 
 
Additionally, Slovenia’s EU Presidency is also influenced by the domestic situation and by 
national politics. It has arrived towards the end of the term of the current government of 
the Prime Minister Janez Janša, just before the beginning of the campaign for the 
parliamentary elections to be held at the end of 2008. The success of Slovenia’s EU 
Presidency and the public administration’s conduct in this context are likely to be issues in 
the campaign. To reduce the influence of national politics on Slovenia’s EU Presidency 
and to prepare it properly, however, half a year before its start the government of Janez 
Janša proposed a co-operation agreement among all political parties in this respect. The 
agreement, modelled after the so-called ‘national unity’ agreement of 1997 regarding 
cooperation on accession to the EU and concluded by all political parties that agreed not 
to use European issues for electoral advantage, stipulated that the Presidency should not 
be burdened by domestic politics, problems and issues. However, two important 
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opposition parties –the LDS (Liberal Democracy of Slovenia) and the SNS (Slovene 
National Party)– rejected it. Consequently, the government of Janez Janša can expect 
that also during Slovenia’s EU Presidency national politics and problems might demand 
the government’s attention and appropriate actions. Among the prime national issues we 
can mention collective bargaining and collective agreements, strikes, privatisations, etc. 
The government also faces a vote of no confidence for individual Ministers and the 
government, while the Prime Minister himself just before the beginning of Slovenia’s EU 
presidency requested and won a vote of confidence in Parliament, which was seen as an 
attempt to consolidate and discipline the governmental coalition. At the time, the option 
was even being discussed that France might take over Slovenia’s turn as President. 
 
The Preparatory Stage – Technical View 
In December 2004 the Council of the EU decided that Slovenia would be the first of the 
‘new’ members to preside it. Consequently, in January 2005 Slovenia established a small 
working group, headed by the Prime Minister, and a broader working group for the 
preparation of Slovenia’s EU Presidency, headed by the Secretary of State for European 
affairs. The broader working group is made up of five sub-groups, covering the following 
issues: the EU Presidency programme; staff; public communication; EU Presidency 
budget; and EU Presidency Secretariat. 
 
The Republic of Slovenia’s budget for the period 2005-08 allocates €62 million to the EU 
Presidency. Compared with the budgets of previous Presidencies this can be considered 
relatively small. The EU Presidency budget includes the construction of the additional 
infrastructure necessary for Slovenia’s EU Presidency (such as, for instance, a new 
Congressional Centre in Brdo), for the training and additional education of around 2,100 
public officials, for the additional temporary employment of around 300 officials, more than 
170 external experts (from Slovenia and abroad) and more than 250 students in public 
administration, and for some 120 additional temporary posts at the permanent 
representation in Brussels. These costs, however, are not exclusive to the Slovenian 
Presidency, but should be considered necessary long-term investments in Slovenia’s 
infrastructure (which, in any case, would have had to be developed sooner or later) and 
human resources. 
 
From this perspective, the EU Presidency is an outstanding opportunity to update and 
develop existing know-how and capacities and to acquire new ones. Simultaneously, the 
EU Presidency is a test of the capacity, competence, knowledge and efficacy of the 
Slovene public administration in the European and international scenarios, and should be 
utilised for an even more successful participation of Slovenia and its representatives in the 
EU and on the international stage. 
 
The Trio – A New Approach to the Presidency of the EU 
In addition to developing their joint 18-month programme for the EU Presidency, the 
members of the first (presiding) ‘Trio’ –Germany, Portugal and Slovenia– each have a 
national programme for their six-month terms as President, more or less based on the 
‘inherited agenda’ of the EU Council. 
 
To ensure the continuity of the EU’s policies –regardless of the failure of the Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe, which introduced the ‘trio presidency’–, the Council 
adopted amended Rules of Procedure in September 2006, determining that: 
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‘Every 18 months, the three Presidencies due to hold office shall prepare, in close 
cooperation with the Commission, and after appropriate consultations, a draft programme 
of Council activities for that period.’ 
 
Additionally, Germany, Portugal and Slovenia agreed to cooperate and to strive for the 
realisation of common goals throughout the 18 months of their Presidencies. For Slovenia 
this cooperation within the Trio is especially important for training, educating and 
exchanging staff. In the six months of its Presidency, Slovenia is scheduled to preside 
over two meetings of the European Council, more than 30 meetings of the Council of the 
EU and more than 50 meetings of Coreper I and II. Added to this, numerous informal 
meetings with member-states, groups of states and European institutions and an 
unknown number of unplanned/unexpected activities and events (such as, for instance, 
the supply of Russian gas in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian disagreements and 
plans for new pipelines, the independence and international recognition of Kosovo –
accompanied by unrest in Serbia and protests in Belgrade–, etc) makes the EU 
Presidency the most difficult task for Slovenia’s government and public administration so 
far –far more demanding than the chairmanship of the OSCE or presiding the UN Security 
Council–. 
 
Slovenian Priorities – Si.nergy for Europe 
In the past there was a perception that the big member-states were very ambitious in their 
plans for their Presidencies, while smaller states tried to be a ‘good Presidency’ that 
catered to the needs and interests of both member-states and EU institutions. The 
present Trio has introduced the common 18-month programme and Slovenia does not 
want to be the weakest link. While presenting Slovenia’s EU Presidency programme in the 
plenary session of the European Parliament, Prime Minister Janez Janša said: 
 
‘Maybe our Presidency will not be on such a large scale as the French one, or as 
resounding as the German one, possibly our public administration does not have such a 
tradition as the British one… possibly we will make some mistakes…. say something too 
directly, possibly in a naïve way… however, Slovenia undertakes its role with all 
responsibility… We will not compete for the spotlight… we will pay all due attention to the 
content. We are aware what we need to do to succeed so far and to be here today…’ 
 
Slovenia has defined five priorities in its national programme for the Presidency of the 
Council of the EU. The President of the European Commission, Mr Durão Barroso has 
said that ‘Slovenia makes concrete policy reform for citizens a central priority’. These 
priorities are: 
 
(1) The timely ratification of the Lisbon Treaty –the first EU treaty signed by all 27 
member states– in all member states. As one of 18 states that ratified the Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Slovenia considers the ratification of the 
Lisbon Treaty and its entry into force –which would ensure the necessary legal 
stability for the EU’s future development– the key priority before the elections for 
the European Parliament in 2009. There is only a year to ratify the treaty in 
accordance with the national legislations of each member state. To serve as a 
positive example, Slovenia ratified the Treaty in January 2008 in order to 
encourage other countries to speed up the process. Being rather naïve in their 
efforts, Slovene politicians soon learnt the lesson lesson. When in January 2008 
the Slovene Prime Minister informed Portugal (on the eve of its decision on the 
mode of ratifying the Lisbon Treaty) that a possible referendum on the Lisbon 
Treaty could lead to delays in its ratification, he was warned by the Portuguese 
Prime Minister José Sócrates that any sovereign nation-state –hence, Portugal 
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also– should have the right to carry out the procedure in accordance with its 
national legislation and taking into account its national political circumstances. 
Portugal has decided to ratify the Lisbon Treaty in Parliament. 
 
(2) Energy and environment are key global issues. Based on the proposal of the 
European Commission of January 2008 and in accordance with the conclusions of 
the European Council of March 2007 regarding the EU’s new integrated climate 
and energy policies, negotiations should take place during the Slovenian 
Presidency and it is hoped that an agreement will be reached by the end of 2008. 
 
(3) The beginning of Slovenia’s Presidency coincides with the beginning of the 
implementation of the second of the three-year cycles of the renewed Lisbon 
Strategy. At the European Council meeting in March 2008 the heads of state and 
government will decide on the further implementation of the strategy of growth and 
employment. Following the Strategic report of the European Commission, Slovenia 
will work for the adoption of the integrated (integral) directives/guidelines for 
growth and employment (2008-10) –paying adequate attention to national 
programmes of reform and being aware that the big and economically powerful 
member states can be the ‘engines’ of European integration–. Unfortunately, 
Britain’s Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, failed to invite Slovenia –as EU 
President– to the informal meeting held in January 2008 by France, Germany, 
Italy, the UK and the President of the EC, Mr Durão Barroso, on behalf of the EU. 
 
(4) Building on positive experiences of the ‘Eastern policy’ and ‘Nordic cooperation’ in 
the past and the current ‘Mediterranean policy’, since 2004 Slovenia has tried to 
make the countries of the Western Balkans one of the core issues of the EU 
agenda as, in addition to their geographical proximity, they share historical, 
economic, political and cultural links with Slovenia. Peace and stability in the 
Balkans are important for the peace, stability and welfare of Europe as a whole, 
considering that a third of the EU’s current member states share their borders with 
Western Balkan countries. Slovenia’s EU Presidency coincides with key phases in 
the accession processes of these countries. Croatia’s negotiations –that started in 
2005– slowed down in 2007 due to their parliamentary elections. Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements still need to be signed with Serbia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The status and the recognition of the independence of Kosovo, and 
the immediate consequences thereof are additional key issues in the region that 
Slovenia’s Presidency has to deal with. In this context the role and activities of 
Slovenia, as the current EU President are even more important and complex due 
to the following: 
 
(a) As a part of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia shared the region’s history and 
established many links and connections with it. Consequently, Slovenia knows 
the region, its individual countries and the problems they are facing. 
Consequently it understands it better than other EU states and this might be 
useful when formulating EU policies, when addressing the complex ethnic, 
political and territorial issues in the area and in managing and resolving crises 
and conflicts. Simultaneously, Slovenia’s linguistic, cultural and economic 
knowledge and links might be useful in promoting and introducing European 
standards and EU perspectives –with further South-Eastern enlargement– in 
the region. 
(b) These advantages, however, might be reduced substantially because of the 
perception in certain circles in the region that Slovenia was responsible for the 
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disintegration of the SFRY. Slovenia’s success –a positive example and hope 
for the future– might also induce a degree of envy. There is also a perception 
that the only reasons for Slovenia’s engagement are its selfish economic and 
other interests. Consequently, a certain mistrust exists that might have a 
negative impact on Slovenia’s relations and cooperation with these countries. 
Croatia, for example, accuses Slovenia of using its EU membership and 
Presidency to exert pressure during its EU accession negotiations. 
(c) By using its geographical proximity, its economic, social and cultural links and 
its knowledge of the local languages and cultures, Slovenia managed to 
develop intense economic cooperation with the countries of the region after 
2000. However, problems in bilateral and/or multilateral relations, such as 
Serbia’s reaction to the independence of Kosovo, might have an impact on 
economic cooperation and on Slovenia’s direct foreign investments in the 
region –not only by causing lower growth rates, but even possibly by 
substantial reducing them–. 
(d) Additionally, there are certain open political issues (eg, border issues with 
Croatia and the Croat economic, fishing and ecological zone in the Adriatic 
Sea) and economic problems (eg, the savings of citizens of those countries in 
the Ljubljanska Banka and property) that should not be disregarded, as they 
might discredit Slovenia as a possible negotiator and mediator on the EU’s 
behalf and might have a negative impact on the EU’s role in ensuring the 
region’s peace, stability and economic development. After all, Slovenia cannot 
ignore its specific national interests in the region and should exercise a 
substantial level of caution in that respect. Consequently, in order to protect 
several billion euros in investments and economic interests –regardless of its 
role in the process and its EU Presidency–, Slovenia cannot be among the first 
countries to officially recognise Kosovo’s independence. The case of Kosovo’s 
independence at the same time reveals the lack of consensus within the EU 
and the absence of a common foreign and security policy, which is the EU’s 
main disadvantage compared with the US, that is simultaneously trying to 
influence the foreign policy of individual EU member states (shown by the 
notes prepared by the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on US-Slovene 
cooperation that were published in the Slovenian and Serbian press). Slovenia 
finally recognised Kosovo’s independence at the beginning of March 2008, 
with a vote of 57 in favour and four against in the National Assembly (out of 90 
members of the Slovenian Parliament). The Slovenian public, however, was 
more divided on the issue, with almost half opposing any immediate 
recognition, especially those of greater age and a higher level of education 
(Politbarometer 2/2008, February 2008, p.31, Center za raziskovanje javnega 
mnenja, http://www.cjm.si/sites/cjm.si/files/file/raziskava_pb/pb2_08.pdf). 
 
(5) The year of intercultural dialogue –2008– can be considered Slovenia’s attempt to 
make a permanent place for ethnic diversity and intercultural dialogue on the EU’s 
agenda, aware that overcoming stereotypes and prejudices is of vital importance 
for the EU’s democratic development in various fields, such as human rights, the 
prevention of all forms of discrimination, controlling migration, offering asylum, 
fighting crime and terrorism, etc. In the international context, coexistence in 
diversity and interculturalism are strategic preconditions for the EU to implement 
successful and credible action in its foreign, security and neighbourhood policies, 
humanitarian aid, etc. 
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This priority became a challenge when –in October 2007– more than 50 members of the 
European Parliament called on the Prime Minister, Janez Janša, to organise a conference 
on the Roma during the Slovenian Presidency, claiming that around 10 million Roma 
could be considered a ‘invisible EU members’. Although Slovenia formally favours the 
development of policies and instruments for the Romas’ inclusion in the EU, it decided to 
reject this suggestion due to its ‘full schedule and limited resources’. The decision, 
however, should be viewed in a broader context: in addition to the fact that the situation of 
the Roma in different member states differs substantially, there is no political consensus 
regarding operational goals, policies or measures for integration of the Roma and these 
issues are considered ‘politically sensitive’. Slovenia formally explained that good 
intentions are not enough and that any activity without a clearly expressed political 
consensus regarding a time-frame and the goals involved might actually work to the 
detriment of the Roma or other minorities. 
 
Conclusions: Slovenia’s Presidency will end the 18-month programme of the first Trio. 
To a large extent, this common programme and contemporary developments within the 
EU have conditioned the priorities and activities of the Trio’s individual national EU 
Presidency programmes. Consequently, the following conclusions can be drawn 
regarding the Slovenian Presidency: 
 
(1) Slovenia, as the last of the first Trio should now focus on the ratification of the 
Treaty, a process that will –most likely– be concluded during the French 
Presidency. 
 
(2) The so called ‘inherited agenda’ of the Council of the EU includes the review of the 
Lisbon Strategy and climate issues. 
 
(3) The fact that Slovenia is the last of this Trio automatically means that much of the 
programme has been carried out by its predecessors Germany and Portugal. 
 
(4) The German Presidency –immediately preceding those of Portugal and Slovenia– 
and the French Presidency –the first of the second Trio– are setting the stage and 
the framework for pursuing their own ambitions as big states, the ‘driving-force of 
European integration’. The Portuguese Presidency managed to organise the 
intergovernmental conference and successfully concluded the Lisbon Treaty. 
Consequently, as with many small states before, the only reasonable role Slovenia 
can play is that of a ‘good Presidency’, ie, in the words of Dr Danilo Türk, 
President of the Republic of Slovenia, a ‘Presidency that is principled, impartial 
and in the best interests of the EU as a whole’. 
 
Irena Brinar 
Lecturer in European Studies, International and the EU Programmes Office, Ljubljana 
University, Slovenia 
